Jenny Kragl received her Doctoral Degree from the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. In her thesis, she examined the role of other-regarding preferences on relational incentive contracts, using the concept of principal-agent models as a theoretical framework. Prior to joining the EBS, Jenny Kragl worked at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin as research associate and member of the Collaborative Research Center "Economic Risk" (SFB 649), funded by the German Research Organization DFG. Her primary fields of research are incentive theory, behavioral, organizational, and experimental economics. Part of her thesis has been published in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
Organization Theory, Personnel Economics, Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics, Contract Theory and Incentives.
Publications in Refereed Journals
Kragl, J. (forthcoming). Group vs. Individual Performance Pay in Relational Employment Contracts when Workers Are Envious. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
Kragl, J., & Schöttner, A. (forthcoming). Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design. International Economic Review.
Kragl, J., & Schmid, J. (2009). The Impact of Envy on Relational Employment Contracts. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 72(2), 766-779.