



PUBLICATIONS

Publications in refereed journals

- Demougin, D. & Helm C. (2011). Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard. *European Economic Review* (forthcoming).
- Deffains, B. & Demougin, D. (2011). Class actions, compliance and moral. *Review of Law and Economics* (forthcoming).
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- Demougin, D. & Fluet, C. (2008). Rules of proof, courts, and incentives. *RAND Journal of Economics*, 39(1), 20-40.
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- Demougin, D., Fluet, C. & Helm, C. (2006). Output and wages with inequality averse agents. *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 39(2), 399-413.

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Current Research Papers

Bental, B. & Demougin, D. (2009). Toxic Assets. Mimeo.

Demougin, D., Fabel, O. & Thomann, Ch. J. (2009). Implicit versus Explicit Incentives: Theory and a Case Study. Submitted to *Economica*.

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